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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a general overview and appraisal of
the Navy's Permanent Change of Station (PCS) planning process,
with an emphasis on PCS Move Forecasting Models. A study was
conducted of all organizations with a role in the management
and budgeting of PCS funds. Interviews were conducted with
representatives from each organization in order to determine
the flow of information between these organizations, and to
identify the processes involved in PCS management. This
thesis further evaluated the PCS move models currently used to
forecast PCS move requirements. Finally, this thesis
evaluated a prototype model developed by the Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center which attempts to quantify the
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I . INTRODUCTION
Each fiscal year the Navy moves hundreds of thousands of
personnel to meet manning requirements, personnel policies,
and readiness objectives. These moves are referred to as
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves. Although the cost of
the PCS portion of the Military Personnel -Navy (MPN)
appropriation accounts for only three percent of the total,
(the MPN appropriation was $19.4 billion in FY 90), it
consistently receives close scrutiny by Congress. This
scrutiny is due in part to past mismanagement of the account,
which resulted in expenditures exceeding the amount authorized
in the budget, and also due to the fact that PCS funds are
often viewed as discretionary by members of Congress and
others in the review process. Because of this attention from
Congress, the Navy requires a means of providing reliable PCS
move forecasts that are supported at all levels of the
organization, and that provide an accurate basis for budget
submissions
.
Each proposed PCS budget must be justified from the
standpoint of PCS policy and the rationale for moving a
specified number of sailors. The PCS budget must also be
justified as an accurate forecast of moves for the coming
year, given current rotation, training, and other policies.
With an annual budget of over $600 million for PCS moves, each
1-percent error in forecasting generates a $6 million error in
allocated funds. [Ref. 1]
For budgetary purposes, PCS moves are subdivided into six
categories, each of which has an officer and enlisted
component. The categories and definitions are summarized
below. [Ref. 1: p. 2]
Accession: Travel from the place of enlistment or
commissioning or from the point of receipt of orders to the
first or new permanent duty station. Travel directly to a
school lasting 20 weeks or more after enlistment or
commissioning is also classified as an accession move, as is
attendance at flight school by newly commissioned officers.
Training: Travel within the continental United States
(CONUS) to and from a permanent duty station and a training
school for a course of 2 weeks or more. Travel from overseas
to a school is not included, nor is travel directly from a
school to overseas. As noted above, accession travel directly
to school is not counted as a training move.
Operational: Travel within CONUS between permanent
duty stations or travel between permanent duty stations
overseas when no transoceanic travel is required.
Rotational: Travel between CONUS and an overseas
permanent duty station or travel between overseas duty
stations requiring transoceanic travel.
Unit: PCS moves in connection with the relocation of
an organized unit.
Separation: Travel upon separation from the service
between the last permanent duty station and the home of record
or point of entry into the service. Travel from overseas for
the purpose of separation is included in this category.
The Navy also categorizes these moves into "mandatory"
moves and "discretionary" moves. Mandatory moves include
accession, separation, and organized unit moves. These are
labeled mandatory because they are determined by end strength
requirements and force structure, and are relatively fixed.
These mandatory moves command priority and are managed within
the Department of the Navy by Pers-7 (whose functions are
addressed in more detail in Chapter II) , and are not
considered "normal" detailing moves.
Discretionary moves include operational, rotational, and
training moves (ORT)
. These moves are a function of sea/shore
rotation policies, current management practices, and training
plans. The number of moves which incurred an obligation of
funds in FY 9 for each of the six types of PCS moves is
listed in Table 1. [Ref. 2]
TABLE 1.--FY 90 PCS COST MOVES










Sub- total 23,199 95,778
Total 35,851 244,224
Source: NPRDC Historical Execution File 1980-1990
The forecasting of discretionary moves has been the focus
of several previous studies. It is an area where some control
can be exercised and, more importantly, where cost savings can
be realized. Figures 1 and 2 depict enlisted and officer
discretionary aggregate move patterns, by month, for ten
fiscal years (FY 81 through FY 90) [Ref . 2: p. 3] . These are
moves that have actually occurred. The erratic patterns could
suggest either that a problem exists in the execution phase of
PCS management, or that the Navy has failed to obtain
budgetary support for its move policies, or perhaps the move
policies themselves are producing this erratic behavior. The
preponderance of moves occur in October, at the beginning of
the fiscal year, while there is a steep decline in the number
of moves occurring at the end of the fiscal year.
Additionally, as might be expected, the number of moves
substantially increases during the summer months when parents
most desire to move school -aged children.
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Figure 2
In terms of cost, the average discretionary move is three
times greater than the average mandatory move. Among
discretionary moves there is considerable variation in average
costs. This is particularly true for the rotational move
which involves transoceanic travel and is the most costly type
of move. Table 2 provides historical discretionary average
move costs for both officer and enlisted for each of the five
fiscal years from 1983 to 1987. The totals consist of a
weighted average of the officer and enlisted moves.
TABLE 2. --AVERAGE COST PER DISCRETIONARY MOVE (IN DOLLARS)
DIS. MOVES FY- 83 FY- 84 FY- 85 FY-86 FY- 87
OPERAT. 2310.03 2120.57 2304.90 2602.45 2589.13
OFF. 3840.85 3503.22 3751.43 4447.54 4502.20
ENL. 1983.93 1839.79 2033.49 2233.11 2153.63
ROTAT
.
5995.96 5466.77 4996.29 5324.40 5372.24
OFF. 9708.68 10265.1 9411.55 9690.29 9710.49
ENL. 5260.88 4549.98 4261.40 4500.08 4484.65
TRAIN. 1644.34 1521.90 1575.06 1575.41 1677.09
OFF. 3286.92 2819.88 3010.63 3229.04 3297.60
ENL. 1164.27 1110.30 1175.36 1126.48 1167.74
TOTAL DIS. 3077.47 2964.96 2913.42 3096.83 3148.13
Source: PERS-203
Another perspective may serve to illustrate the apparent
incongruity of PCS moves as they relate to total enlisted end
strength. Using source data obtained from Commander Robert
Hillary, Pers-402, Figure 3 depicts the number of funded PCS
moves versus enlisted end strength for fiscal years 1975
through 1997. The 1992 through 1997 end strength figures
represent projected end strength based on the most current end
strength plans. As the graph shows, there is an inverse
relationship between enlisted end strength and PCS moves
executed. The source data revealed that in 10 of the 15 years
between 1975 and 1990 this inverse relationship existed. This
might support the author's hypothesis that PCS policies in the
aggregate are leading to increased PCS move requirements at a














































































Consideration must also be given to some of the external
influences affecting the PCS decision environment. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has been in the process
since 1989 of creating a joint service Permanent Change of
Station Management Information System (PCSMIS) . This system,
located at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in
Monterey, California, is tasked with maintaining a centralized
data base on active duty personnel assignment actions and PCS
costs. [Ref. 3: p. 11]
It is the author's opinion that the PCSMIS system is a
long way from providing useful information to Department of
Defense (DOD) managers exercising their oversight role because
much of the data in the system has not been updated since
1989, and because 1991 queries to the system from DOD were
almost nonexistent. However, use of the system when fully
implemented could call into question some of the assignment
actions and planning assumptions addressed in subsequent
chapters of this thesis. For example, data on early
detachments presented in Chapter IV could suggest that there
is a problem with using the Projected Rotation Date (PRD) as
the primary planning assumption in PCS forecasting models.
This thesis addresses the PCS planning and budgeting
process with an emphasis on methods and models used to
forecast PCS moves. Chapter II provides an overview of the
PCS budget process using a functional approach. It reviews
all of the organizations with a role in the management and
budgeting of PCS funds, examines existing interfaces, and
provides a time line for these processes. Chapter III
analyzes the existing Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center (NPRDC) PCS forecasting model, focusing on problems
identified with the model. Chapter IV examines alternative
methods for forecasting PCS moves and Chapter V contains the
research conclusions and recommended actions to improve the
Navy's PCS budget process.
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II. OVERVIEW OF PCS MANAGEMENT AND BUDGETING
The management of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves
and the budgeting of funds for these moves involves multiple
organizations performing a variety of functions. This chapter
describes these organizations and summarizes their respective
roles and interfaces with regard to PCS management and
budgeting. Figure 4 on the following page illustrates the
relationships between the various organizations and the flow
of data, reports and information [Ref . 3: p. 32] . Figure 4





A. ORGANIZATIONS AND ROLES
Within the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) there are
four key participants in PCS management. They are the
Assistant Chief for MPN Financial Management (Pers-7) ; the PCS
Variance Analysis Department (PCSVAD) , located at the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) in Cleveland, Ohio but
reporting to Pers-7 as a field activity; the Assistant Chief
for Policy and Career Development (Pers-2/OP-134) ; and the
Assistant Chief for Distribution (Pers-4) . A summary of the
role of each is provided below.
1. Assistant Chief for MPN Financial Management (Pers-7)
Pers-7 is responsible for the administration and
management of the MPN appropriation as well as portions of
various other appropriations. Pers-7 reports to BUPERS and
ultimately to the Chief of Naval Operations (CPNAV) . Pers-7
interfaces with other BUPERS and OPNAV organizations, the
Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) , and other various field
activities. [Ref. 3: p. 6]
The MPN appropriation ($19.4 billion in FY 90) includes
Strength Costs (89%) , Special Pays (8%) , and PCS requirements
(3%) . "Strength Costs" refers to the normal pay and
allowances received by service members. The MPN appropriation
is a centrally managed account with Pers-7 performing the
functional processes of budgeting, accounting, and reporting.
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PCS travel is one of six budget activities associated with the
budgeting function performed by Pers-7 for the MPN account.
Pers-7, as the manpower claimant, submits an MPN budget to
NAVCOMPT in May or June of the year prior to the budget year
(the "Off-year") . NAVCOMPT will hold hearings on the proposed
budget for approximately two months. This is where various
portions of the budget are defended prior to submission to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . This occurs around
September of the off-year. OSD will engage in hearings
conducted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) , which
will ultimately produce the President's budget. This budget
is submitted to Congress in January of the actual budget year.
The PCS portion of this budget is subject to review at any
stage in this process.
The PCS budget is created and monitored by Pers-71, which
is the division within Pers-7 responsible for PCS management
and budgeting. As mentioned in Chapter I, there are basically
two categories of moves: mandatory and discretionary. Pers-7
treats each of these categories separately in creating the PCS
budget as well as in executing the budget.
Mandatory moves, which include accession, separation, and
organized unit moves, are less controllable and have a
priority over discretionary moves. The funding and execution
for these moves is controlled directly by Pers-7 rather than
the PCS execution manager, Pers-46.
14
In forecasting the numbers of mandatory moves, Pers-7
first determines the specific numbers of accession and
separation moves based on officer and enlisted end strength
plans and their respective retention rates. Homeport changes
and unit establishment/disestablishment reports received from
OP- 80 are used to determine organized unit move requirements.
The important distinction made during the budgeting
process between mandatory and discretionary moves is that
Pers-7 forecasts the actual numbers of mandatory moves (with
the modeling assistance of PCSVAD) . Pers-7 then attempts to
"cost -out" these moves in creating the budget.
In contrast, discretionary moves are modeled by 0P-
134/Pers-20 as part of the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
process. These figures are then reviewed and commented on by
Pers-46. Then the cost of these "numbers of moves" is
estimated by Pers-7. This is significant due to the fact that
it is the discretionary moves which have historically been the
most difficult to forecast and they are the moves that receive
the closest scrutiny by OSD and Congress.
Pers-7 works with Pers-463 to prepare the PCS status brief
which is presented monthly to BUPERS . All information
distributed on PCS funds is released by Pers-7, even though
most of the reports disseminated for use by other
organizations come from PCSVAD.
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2. Assistant Chief for Distribution (Pers-4)
Pers-4 is responsible for assigning military personnel
to duty stations by writing Permanent Change of Station
Orders. Pers-4 writes the majority of PCS orders, except
those for non- designated personnel who are handled by the
Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) , and those
written by certain field activities with the authority to
write PCS orders. Pers-463, as the Distribution Manager, is
responsible for the management of PCS funds within Pers-4.
[Ref. 3: p. 7]
Currently, PCS costing is computed in a two-step process.
Step 1 occurs when the detailer writes the orders. This is
labeled a "reservation" of PCS funds. Reservation amounts are
derived from "step 1 cost tables" prepared by PCSVAD. These
cost tables consist of historical average cost per move rates
based on pay grade, distance and location of move, and the
number of primary dependents. Each set of orders has a
reservation cost associated with it.
This reservation cost is manually entered from the step 1
cost tables along with all other details of the orders into
the Officer Assignment Information System (OAIS) or Enlisted
Assignment Information System (EAIS) . Although EAIS is
automated, there are many instances when its use would
miscalculate the reservation cost. Consequently,
approximately fifty percent of enlisted orders are written
16
through a manual system. These issues are addressed in detail
in Section B of this chapter.
Pers-463 plans the allocation of funds within Pers-4
through the creation of a time-phased Operation Plan (OPLAN)
.
The OPLAN is a distribution plan which details move
requirements on a monthly basis. Pers-463 monitors the
execution of the OPLAN, contributing information for the
monthly PCS status brief along with Pers-7. The OPLAN is not
automated. [Ref. 3: p. 7]
Pers-4 also has a role in budget preparation as a
supporting player to Pers-7 and Pers-2. Because the Pers-2
organization has not been introduced yet, a brief discription
of their role is provided to help illustrate Pers-4'
s
supporting position.
Pers-2 is responsible as a program manager for developing
PCS requirements as part of the Program Objectives Memorandum
(POM) process. The POM identifies move requirements in the
out -years as part of the Six Year Defense Plan (SYDP) . Pers-4
is supposed to participate in this process, validating Pers-
2's numbers, as well as providing information to help in
forecasting move requirement numbers.
The entire planning and budgeting process is very dynamic
and things can change significantly from the time the actual
number of planned moves is estimated (POM) , until the actual
execution phase. One example of this dynamic nature would be
caused by a policy change that affects overseas tour lengths.
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Hence the requirement for constant interaction between Pers-4,
Pers-2, and Pers-7. The budgeting process allows a certain
amount of flexibility for unforseen changes, as described
above, as long as information about the effects are accurately
quantified and provided in a timely manner. Pers-4, as
Director of Distribution, and specifically Pers-463, as the
Distribution Manager, must concern itself with first
identifying actual or potential policy changes and then
ensuring that the ramifications of these changes are entered
into the budget process.
3. Permanent Change of Station Variance Analysis
Department (PCSVAD)
PCSVAD, located at the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS) in Cleveland, Ohio, has the sole authority to
create obligations for PCS move costs. Obligations are a
critical part of the budget process as they represent amounts
that will be expended from the PCS account by the Accounting
Division of Pers-7. Obligations are incurred in the month
that the PCS orders are executed by the member. At the
expected date of the move, PCSVAD converts the step I
reservation into a "step II" obligation.
The step II obligation is computed based on information
contained in the Travel Information Form (TIF) obtained from
the member making the move. It is the responsibility of the
member to fill this card out and mail it to PCSVAD prior to
18
commencement of travel. The TIF contains the specifics of the
move that may have been unavailable at the time the orders
were written. This includes up-to-date information on the
number of dependents accompanying the member, approximate
weight of the household goods shipment, etc. If this form is
not received (current compliance rate is only approximately
50%) , PCSVAD transfers the reservation amount to an obligation
using the original step I cost estimate.
PCSVAD creates the actual obligation and compares this to
the reservation amount for a variety of reasons to include:
(1) to identify trends which would affect the accuracy of the
step I cost estimate tables; (2) to identify variations of
interest to the Distribution Management and Control Division
of the Distribution Department (Pers-463); and (3) to provide
budget, projections to Pers-7. PCSVAD accomplishes this last
function by providing an accurate average move cost to enable
Pers-7 to attach a dollar amount to the forecast number of
moves. [Ref. 3: p. 5]
PCSVAD is also responsible for creating and updating the
cost tables upon which the reservation costs and actual
obligations are based. A tremendous amount of geographic and
economic data is statistically analyzed and incorporated into
these cost tables. The economic data is received from the
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the Military
Airlift Command (MAC) in the form of transportation rates.
These rates are updated semi-annually based on commercial van
19
rates, transoceanic shipment costs, fuel costs and general
inflation. The cost tables are updated as required in order
to accurately reflect the average cost per move for each move
category. However, it is generally accepted by Pers-7 that it
would not be cost-effective to produce these cost tables more
frequently than semi-annually.
The step I tables are distributed in "paper form" since
recent attempts to automate the tables have proven to be only
marginally successful. This is because the automation of the
step I cost tables was attempted by NPRDC as a component of
the Enlisted Personnel Allocation and Nomination System
(EPANS)
.
EPANS was a project designed to provide computerized
assistance to detailers by automating the assignment process.
EPANS was to nominate people to available billets as well as
to aid in cost calculations. While still in the testing
phase, EPANS was evaluated as unsatisfactory and the project
was terminated. Since no separate PCS cost module had been
developed, the automation of the step I tables was also
halted.
Pers-45 has since requested a separate PCS cost module
that would automate the step I costs in the order writing
system. A start date for this project has not been identified
at the time of this writing.
20
4. Assistant Chief for Policy and Career Development
(Pers-2)
Pers-2 is the branch responsible for formulating
policy governing military personnel. PCS policy falls within
the scope of their authority. PCS policy direction is
determined by Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of
Naval Operations, and input from other sources within the
Navy. Within Pers-2, Pers-22 coordinates the review and
distribution of PCS policy information. Comments and policy
feedback are collected from Pers-46 and Pers-7. Pers-22
evaluates these comments, makes any desired changes, and then
promulgates official PCS policy. [Ref. 3: p. 7]
The flag officer in charge of OP-13/Pers-2 has dual
reporting responsibilities. He is within the organization of
the Chief of Naval Operations as a manpower planner and
reports to BUPERS for policy and career development. Within
the OPNAV organization, OP-13/Pers-2 is responsible for
forecasting PCS requirements. These requirements are
determined as part of the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
process
.
The POM represents the programming phase of the Navy's
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) . The POM
is essentially a biennial decision-making process which seeks
to translate planning forces and fiscal guidance constraints
into achievable packages (Programs) . PCS requirements must be
determined and included as part of the POM. The POM planning
21
begins in the September prior to the budget year (off-year)
and is submitted to OSD in April of the budget year (on-year) .
The results of the POM are submitted as changes to the Six
Year Defense Plan (SYDP)
.
Pers-20 forecasts PCS move requirements for the upcoming
budget year and for five out -years during the POM process.
For this purpose, input data is received from the Enlisted
Master Records (EMR) and Officer Master Records (OMR) files.
These files contain Projected Rotation Dates (PRDs) on all
service members. Other information comes from Pers-11 for
training quotas of 20 weeks or longer, as well as the inputs
previously discussed from Pers-46 and Pers-7.
Pers-20 also works very closely with Pers-7 in creating
the PCS budget. As mentioned previously, Pers-7 attaches
actual dollars to the move estimates in budget formulation.
Pers-20 also plays a supporting role in monitoring the
execution of the PCS budget. This execution monitoring
assistance action is requested by Pers-4 and Pers-7 on a
continuing basis as a means of providing feedback on the
accuracy of the original move forecasts.
B. INFORMATION RESOURCES
The foregoing section introduced all of the organizations
involved in the management of PCS funds and their respective
roles. This section details the information resources
available to these organizations and examines the existing
22
interfaces between them. A brief description of each
information system is provided below:
MPS: The Military Personnel -Navy Financial Management
System (MFS) is an automated system designed to provide Pers-7
with the means to effectively manage and control the MPN and
RPN appropriations. Within this system, implemented in 1976,
resides a PCS module which is used to store and report
information relative to PCS management. Specifically, MFS is
the original storehouse for current PCS reservation data. MFS
provides the link to PCSVAD for bureau orders and associated
reservation cost data. [Ref. 3: p. 6]
MFS was created so that the detailers could better manage
their "checkbooks." Each enlisted detailer within Pers-40
(the Enlisted Assignment Division) is allotted funding from
which to issue orders. This allotment then serves as a
"checkbook" as orders are written against it. MFS provides
weekly reports which provides a summary of reservations made
by detailers and obligations entered by PCSVAD. The primary
users are the execution manager of PCS funds (PERS-463) and
Pers-7 (as the major claimant). MFS also stores obligation
and expenditure data and serves as a pass -through of reports
distributed within BUPERS and PCSVAD.
The MFS software runs on the Consolidated Data Center
(CDC) IBM 3081 mainframe computer located in Cleveland, Ohio.
The support staff, however, is located at BUPERS in the Navy-
Annex, Washington, D.C. The PCS portion of MFS uses
23
approximately eighty- five percent of the MFS system's storage
requirements. It is important to note that although MFS
provides the detailers and distribution managers with PCS
checkbook balances, these are only interim reports. The
official account balances are obtained from PCSVAD through
their database (PRODS) . There currently exists no single
shareable data base for PCS data.
PRODS: PCSVAD' s PCS Reservation/Obligation Data Base
System (PRODS) is located on the CDC's IBM 3081 mainframe
computer located in Cleveland, Ohio. PRODS creates the
official obligations and also creates reservations for those
orders that are written by field commands. The source of
input data for obligations is the Travel Information Forms
(TIF) submitted by the members performing the travel. As
mentioned earlier, TIF submission compliance averages about
fifty percent. If the TIF is not submitted, PRODS converts
the step I reservations into step II obligations using the
original reservation amount. All step II costs are inflated
a little more than 1 percent as a margin of safety to prevent
overexpenditure of the PCS account
.
PRODS also creates the cost tables used to generate both
reservations and obligations. The source of input for these
calculations are PCS expenditure history files, geographic




PRODS interfaces directly with MFS to receive reservation
data and also to provide obligation data. Both database
systems compare obligations to reservations. It is PRODS
output, however, that is used by Pers-7 to monitor execution
of the PCS budget. As previously mentioned, the reports
generated by PRODS provide official detailer checkbook
balances.
The current situation of having co-hosted systems (MFS and
PRODS are both operated on the same bank of hardware in
Cleveland) resulted in the duplication of data in March 1991
due to the conversion of the PRODS system from a Prime
minicomputer to the IBM mainframe located at the CDC.
Additionally, the CDC, as part of DFAS, Cleveland, is now a
DOD activity. Beginning in FY 92, the Navy will be charged by
DOD for processing time on the CDC. These processing costs
have not been factored into the FY 92 PCS budget.
EAIS: The Enlisted Assignment Information System
(EAIS) is an automated order writing system used by enlisted
detailers to generate orders. It is menu-driven and contains
a logical sequence of data entry screens that enable a
detailer to quickly and easily "cut" a set of orders. The
step I cost for a set of orders, however, is manually inputed
by the detailer. The detailer computes the step I cost using
the cost tables. A critical function that EAIS performs, with
respect to the management and tracking of PCS funds, is the
construction of the Customer Identification Code (CIC)
.
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The CIC is an eight-digit code that consists of five
elements: the type of move, the reason for travel, the fiscal
year, the detailing branch, and the Budgeting Operating Target
(OPTAR) fiscal manager. The CIC is used as a tracking device
by PCSVAD. It provides the link between each leg of a set of
orders (e.g., schools, temporary duty stations, etc.) and the
ultimate duty station. PCSVAD never sees the actual orders,
therefore it must use the CIC to correlate each leg of a move
to the original orders. Reservation and obligation costs
associated with a set of orders are accounted for as a whole
and the CIC allows for a "sum of the parts." While CIC
construction is automated in EAIS, on-site interviews with
detailers conducted during the research revealed several
problems in this area.
One problem arises whenever a detailer wishes to send a
person to an Accounting Category Code (ACC) 341 school (19
weeks or less) enroute to his/her permanent duty station from
an accession school (the ACC is a component of the CIC) . In
this situation EAIS automatically constructs a CIC which
identifies the move as a training move charged to the
detailers training move account. However, for accounting and
budgeting purposes, this move is considered an accession move
(see Chapter I definitions), i.e., it belongs in an entirely
separate PCS account. In effect, EAIS counts this move twice
since by definition schools less than 20 weeks performed in
conjunction with an accession are counted as only one move.
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It is the author's opinion that double counting PCS moves in
this manner could lead to forecasting errors in PCS
forecasting models. This is because the current PCS
forecasting model is a time-series forecasting model. Any
over- count in one year could bias the move estimate for the
following year's forecast.
Another example of where the automatic construction of the
CIC caused problems was during the decommisioning of the USS
Midway. This resulted in a change of homeport for over 5,000
sailors. EAIS listed the homeport as San Diego, which was the
eventual homeport; however, the actual homeport at the time of
the move was Yokosuka, Japan. This would have resulted (and
in some cases did) in charging the account for an Operational
move when in fact a Rotational move (the most costly of moves)
was involved.
Similarly, detailers expressed reservations about using
the dependent information available in EAIS. Dependent data
is often not up to date and could result in the miscalculation
of the step I cost. For example, if a member was separated or
divorced and therefore not planning on moving any dependents,
and EAIS still showed the original number of dependents, then
the reservation cost would be overstated. In most cases the
detailer will verify this information over the phone with the
service member.
In each of the cases mentioned above, as well as for
several others, the detailer must forego writing the orders in
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EAIS. Instead, the detailer will write the orders and
manually construct a CIC in an alternative system called the
Readiness Information System (RIS) . The original advertising
for EAIS was that it would interface with NES, but the two
systems would not be dependent on one another. Currently
Pers-4 63 managers are not confident enough in the EAIS system
to allow it to provide a direct feed to MPS. This is due to
the inherent problems with the system identified in this
section. The general feeling among those interviewed is that
EAIS is a prototype system that was stood up as a production
system. A need was expressed by detailers and financial
managers alike to make improvements to EAIS to bring the
system more in line with the OAIS system.
RIS: The Readiness Information System (RIS) is an
information retrieval system maintained by EPMAC and was the
"old" manual order writing system prior to EAIS. It allows
detailers to modify a set of orders to include their best
estimate of the PCS cost. This will be the amount actually
charged against the "checkbook balance." The detailers
actually write orders in two different systems, EAIS and RIS.
The detailers make roughly equal use of EAIS and RIS during
the process of writing orders. Both RIS output, containing
orders information, and EAIS output pass through the New
Enlisted System (NES) on the way to update enlisted personnel
files in MPS.
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NES: The New Enlisted System (NES) acts as a pass-
through for reservation data from EAIS and RIS to MFS . NES is
part of the personnel data network. The primary function of
NES is to collectively edit and update the Enlisted Master
Records (EMR) file. NES updates to the personnel and
financial master files are run every Monday, Wednesday, and
Friday.
OAIS: The Officer Assignment Information System
(OAIS) is an automated order writing system used by officer
detailers to generate orders. Designed concurrently and with
the same purpose in mind as its sister system, EAIS, it is not
plagued by the problems associated with EAIS. There are two
primary reasons for this. First, OAIS is subject to better
input control; and secondly, it is designed better.
There are far fewer officer detailers and, generally, they
are better trained. This allows the distribution department
to verify all cost information on officer orders prior to
transmission of the orders to PCSVAD. The end result is fewer
input errors. There are system design differences between
EAIS and OAIS as well. The most important difference is that
OAIS does not automatically generate the CIC. The officer
detailer must enter the CIC in the system in a manner similar
to what the enlisted detailer does in RIS. While there is a
tradeoff here as far as the time required to enter the CIC, it
is more than justified in terms of the reduced orders
reconciliation time spent by disbursing clerks in Pers-463.
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Finally, OAIS is purely an order writing system. It
interfaces directly with MFS . Unlike EAIS, OAIS is capable of
properly editing orders information that is used by Pers-7
financial managers. This direct interface provides Pers-7
with up-to-date extracts of reservation data. EAIS orders
information, as previously mentioned, must first be edited by
the NES system prior to being passed to MFS.
This section has focused on the current information
systems available to decision-makers in the PCS environment.
Section A identified the respective roles of each organization
involved in the process. Chapters III and IV will analyze
existing and alternative PCS forecasting models used by
financial managers in the annual PCS budget submission.
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III. NPRDC PCS FORECASTING MODEL
A. HISTORY
In August 1989 the Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center (NPRDC) released a model entitled "Forecasting PCS ORT
Moves Using Tree Classifications." This model was designed to
provide an objective method to produce PCS move forecasts for
use in budget development and execution. The research was
sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 01) with the
work request coming from the Assistant Chief for MPN Financial
Management (Pers-7). The NPRDC model represents the only
official ORT PCS forecasting model in existence.
B. THE MODEL STRUCTURE
1. Assumptions
The NPRDC model uses a technique known as "tree
classification" to generate move forecasts. Tree
classification assigns every member of the "target population"
(every member on active duty, or coming on active duty, in the
Navy during the three-year forecast horizon) to exactly one
class. The classes are designed so that the move behavior of
the individuals within a class will be homogenous with respect
to when they expect to move. [Ref. 2: p. 4]
The primary assumption of this model is that current PCS
move policies will remain in effect during the forecast
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period. A follow- on to this assumption is that the impact of
current PCS policies will remain constant within each class.
The model also assumes that little is known about future
accession plans, thereby dictating the use of the previous
year's accessions as an estimate of the forecast year's
accessions. Finally it assumes that all PRD changes are a
result of policy changes. 1
2. The Tree Classification
The classification tree used in the analysis
(reproduced from the NPRDC report) is shown in Figure 5.
[Ref . 2: p. 4] As shown in Figure 5, the NPRDC model provides
only a three-year forecast horizon.
1 The research conducted during this thesis concludes
otherwise: that is, PRDs can be changed by the detailers and
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Source: NPRDC PCS ORT Report Documentation [Ref. 2: p. 4]
Figure 5
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The tree differentiates between service personnel onboard
at the beginning of the three -year forecast and those members
who will be accessed by the Navy during the forecast horizon.
As mentioned above, the model assumes that little is known
about future accessions. Because of this, and in the absence
of accession plans, the NPRDC model uses the number of
accessions from the most recently completed fiscal year for
their forecasts. In light of current plans to reduce end
strength, an important improvement in this model would be to
use up-to-date accession plans for these future forecasts.
For the members onboard at the beginning of the forecast
period, it is assumed that most have a valid projected
rotation date (PRD) and that this date occurs within the
three-year forecast horizon. These members are classified
into one of three groups: members with a PRD falling within
the first forecast year; members whose PRD falls in the second
forecast year; and members whose PRD is in the third forecast
year. All members with a PRD occurring prior to the forecast
horizon are classified into a fourth group. Members whose PRD
extends beyond the forecast period comprise a fifth
classification group. [Ref. 2: p. 5]
The other service members on this side of the tree are
those whose PRD is missing. In order to classify and quantify
these people, the model uses the Accounting Category Code
(ACC) , which is an element of the Customer Identification Code
(CIC) , and which is on every set of orders issued. Based on
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the ACC, these members are categorized into five groups:
Short-term training (STT) ; long-term training (LTT) [greater
than 2 weeks] ; recruit training; other temporary duty (Other
Temp) ; and other permanent duty (Other Per) . These last two
categories, Other Temp and Other Per, are relatively small
miscellaneous categories that represent the remaining members
who cannot be classified into the three larger categories.
3 . Mathematical Framework
Once individuals have been grouped into classes using
the classification tree, PCS move forecasts are made for each
class separately. A set of within-class probabilities gives
the proportion of the class expected to make PCS moves for
each of the next three fiscal years. Within each class,
separate forecasts are provided for each type of move (i.e.,
operational, rotational, or training), and for each type
whether it is a "cost" move or a "total" move ("total" moves
include those moves that are no-cost moves). 2 Forecasts are
further broken down for each detailing branch. For example,
one within- class probability would be estimated for the
proportion of all enlisted members currently in long-term
training who would be expected to make an operational "Cost"
PCS move in January FY 92 and who are detailed by Pers-402,
the Engineering/Hull Assignment Branch. [Ref. 2: p. 5]
2A cost move occurs whenever a member moves between units
that are greater than 50 miles apart.
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The forecast for the number of each move type for the
non-accession classes is calculated as the product of the
number of members onboard in the class at the end of the
fiscal year and the within- class probability for that specific
type of move. For accession classes, the calculation is the
product of the projected number of "surviving" accessions and
the within- class probability for that accession class. A sum
across classes, by type, yields the final output.
The within- class probability of making a PCS move is
calculated using the most recent move behavior of members by
type of move whose classes were determined from the Officer
Master File (OMF) and Enlisted Master Record (EMR) . When
calculating the within- class probability of moves one year
ahead, the classes are determined from the OMF and EMR one
year previous. The within- class probability of a move two
years in the future would use the master files from two years
previous, and so on. The within- class probability of a FY 92
move for move type A within- class B is defined as:
# of FY91 Moves of Move Type A made
Prob(A,B,FY92) = by end of FY90 by members of Class B
# of End FY90 members in Class B
Similarly, the derivation of within- class probabilities for FY
93 is analogous to the FY 92 procedure, except the end FY 89
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1. Accuracy of the Forecasts
The author evaluated the PCS ORT model on its
predictive validity in forecasting total PCS cost moves for
both officer and enlisted personnel. A comparison was made
between actual moves and the forecasted estimates for fiscal
years 1989 through 1991. The percentage deviation between the
actual values and the estimates was used as a measure of
forecast accuracy, using the formula: [Forecast-
Actual/Actual] . These values and the percentage forecast
error are shown in Tables 3 and 4 for enlisted and officer
personnel, respectively.
TABLE 3. --TOTAL ENLISTED COST PCS MOVES FY 89-91 (PCS ORT
MODEL FORECAST COMPARISON)
FY Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
1989 86,329 93,931 -8.09
1990 96,462 95,778 0.71
1991 90,882 99,253 -8.43
Source: NPRDC Historical Files
37
TABLE 4. --TOTAL OFFICER COST PCS MOVES FY 89-91 (PCS ORT MODEL
FORECAST COMPARISON)
FY Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
1989 20,607 23,008 -10.43
1990 22,988 23,199 -0.91
1991 22,387 22,423 -0.16
Source: NPRDC Historical Files
The model was further evaluated on predictive accuracy for
each of the three categories of moves, (i.e., operational,
rotational, and training). This becomes important from a
budgeting standpoint because average move costs vary-
significantly by category. Consequently, budget planners
would desire that the forecast errors be lowest for rotational
moves, as they represent the most expensive type of move.
Conversely, training moves are the least expensive, so a
larger forecast error could be tolerated. In addition,
officer moves are much more expensive than enlisted moves in
every category, on average. Relative to their enlisted
counterparts, a higher percentage of officers have dependents
and more household goods to transport. Errors in estimating
annual move volumes in these categories can generate larger
dollar errors despite the smaller move volumes. [Ref . 1: p.
3] The results of the evaluations by type are shown
separately for each fiscal year in Tables 5, 6, and 7.
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TABLE 5. --FY 19 89 PCS COST MOVES BY TYPE
PCS Category Forecasts Actual Error
(Percent)
Enlisted
Operational 31,686 37,595 -15.71
Rotational 28,219 29,515 -4.39
Training 26,424 26,821 -1.48
Officer
Operational 7,270 8,521 -14.68
Rotational 5,086 5,862 -13.24
Training 8,251 8,625 -4.34
Source: NPRDC
TABLE 6. --FY 199 PCS COST MOVES BY TYPE
PCS Category Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
Enlisted
Operational 38,252 39,626 -3.47
Rotational 30,134 29,613 1.76
Training 28,077 26,539 5.78
Officer
Operational 8,325 8,618 -3.4
Rotational 5,770 5,888 -2.0
Training 8,893 8,693 2.3
Source: NPRDC
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TABLE 7 FY 1991 PCS COST MOVES BY TYPE
PCS Category Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
Enlisted
Operational 39,310 44,403 -11.47
Rotational 29,247 30,855 -5.21
Training 22,325 23,995 -6.96
Officer
Operational 8,563 8,929 -4.1
Rotational 5,780 5,689 1.6
Training 8, 044 7,805 3.06
Source: NPRDC
Two other measures of forecast accuracy were examined.
These were the mean absolute deviation (MAD) and the mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) . The MAD calculations simply
involves computing the average absolute errors over the three
years for which we have data. The MAPE is obtained by
computing the absolute percentage error for each time period,
summing these percentage errors, and dividing by the number of
values used. [Ref. 4: p. 56] Table 8 shows the MAD and MAPE
for all move categories.
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TABLE 8. --MAD AND MAPE AS A MEASURE OF FORECAST ACCURACY
FY 89-91
COST PCS MOVES BY TYPE (FY 89-91) MAD MAPE
Enlisted OP Cost Moves 4125.33 10.21
Enlisted ROT Cost Moves 1141.67 3.79
Enlisted TRA Cost Moves 1201.67 4.74
Total Enlisted Cost Moves 5552.00 5.74
Officer OP Cost Moves 677.67 7.39
Officer ROT Cost Moves 328.33 5.61
Officer TRA Cost Moves 271.00 3.23
Total Officer Cost Moves 882.67 3.83
2. Comments on the NPRDC Model Results
It is hard to determine the acceptable level of
accuracy in these forecasts. Interviews conducted during the
research revealed that there is no published guidance
concerning this matter. It was generally accepted by budget
planners, however, that any error over five percent was
unacceptable. Evaluating forecast accuracy in terms of actual
execution is also clouded by the fact that, to some extent,
there is a causal relationship between the original forecast
error and the number of moves actually completed during a
given fiscal year. For example, if budget requirements were
understated (due to the number of moves being under-
predicted)
,
a September move might be delayed until October
when new fiscal year funds become available. This causal
relationship could be explicitly tested for if more years of
41
actual and forecasted data were available. One suggested
statistical technique that could be used to accomplish this is
the Student's T-test.
Clearly, the NPRDC model did not perform well in either FY
89 or FY 91 on the enlisted side. In FY 90, however, the
enlisted move projection was within one percent of actual
execution. For officers, while the FY 89 forecast totals
under-predicted requirements by over ten percent, the FY 90
and FY 91 forecasts were within one percent. An explanation
for this could be that officer career patterns are more stable
and less subject to policy variation.
When asked about the poor showing of the models in FY 89
and FY 91, both Pers-2 and Pers-4 budget officers claimed that
any time significant policy variation occurs, the NPRDC
forecasts become unreliable. Ironically, according to Pers-46
execution planners, it was ship decommissionings and force
structure changes that accounted for the large increase in FY
91 total moves and not the Persian Gulf War.
Commander Hillery, Head, Pers-402, Engineering/Hull
Assignment Branch, examined the NPRDC model and provided the
following comments. First, his evaluation was that the model
presumes valid and stable PRDs which do not allow for changes
in PRD, such as population shifts that are not a result of
policy changes, and for changes in policies which do affect
PRDs.
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Population shifts refer primarily to the annual
advancement cycle. Enlisted distribution is determined by
rate, qualification, and pay grade. Each year the advancement
cycle generates move requirements. A unit may be in a
position of having too many senior personnel filling key
billets. This is, in reality, an artificial population shift,
that is, only the margins are moved. Still, there is pressure
to move personnel. In the real world, detailers adjust for
this by recognizing that there are personnel onboard with a
high probability of being advanced and therefore, in this
instance, they would be unlikely to fill a gapped billet prior
to completion of the advancement cycle.
Policy changes which affect PRDs include sea/shore
rotation policies, overseas tour lengths, short-tours with
guaranteed re -tours, decommissionings, homeport changes, new
commissionings, as well as changes in individual PRDs caused
by advancements
.
Secondly, according to Commander Hillery, the model uses
as an input the number of accessions from the most recently
completed fiscal year. Aside from the implications of not
accounting for changes in service growth plans, this also does
not account for the annual variability in rating
classifications. The model also presumes that the accession
attrition rate (e.g., "survivors") is stable.
Commander Ayers, Head, Pers-463, listed his concerns by
stating that BUPERS needs a PCS forecasting model that can
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calculate the "what if" effects of PCS policy changes, which
the NPRDC model is unable to do. His reasoning was that the
budget system is not flexible enough to deal with the large
volume of policy changes. He gave a recent example in which
the overseas tour lengths in the Phillipines were changed
because of a security problem, which ultimately increased PCS
requirements by over $13 million in a single fiscal year.
The most frequently recurring comment on the NPRDC model
received during the research was, "Why spend so much time and
money generating these forecasts (in terms of manpower and
data collection costs) when basically the results are little
better than a three-year average?
In light of the expressed reservations with the NPRDC
model discussed above, alternative PCS move forecasting
methods and models have been developed by BUPERS budget
planners. One such model was developed by Commander Keller
(Pers-20) in 1988, and it was the move projections from this
model that formed the basis for the FY 91 and FY 92 PCS budget
submission. Organizational support for this model has since
been withdrawn (Commander Keller retired in July 1991)
,
although no viable alternative exists at this time. This
model is reviewed in Chapter IV, in which a comparison of
forecast accuracy is made with the NPRDC forecasting model.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE PCS FORECASTING MODELS
A. PERS-20 MODEL
1 . Background
Commander Jack Keller, while assigned to Pers-20 in
the summer of 1988, developed his own model for forecasting
enlisted operational, rotational, and training move
requirements. The reason he developed this forecasting model
stemmed from his feeling that the cuts in the PCS budget in
fiscal years (FY) 87 and 88 were rather arbitrary. He
believed that these cuts were made because the Navy lacked a
defensible means of justifying their PCS requirements.
According to Commander Keller, when the Navy analyst's
forecasts were challenged by OSD and Congressional staffers,
the typical response was that the forecasts were their "best
guess" estimates.
Commander Keller cited an example that occurred at the
end of FY 87. During this time it became apparent that there
would be a shortfall in the MPN account. NAVCOMPT directed
OP- 01 to come up with a $19 million reduction in MPN
expenditures. Of this $19 million, the PCS account was
targeted for a reduction of $15.7 million, with the remaining




When Congress reviewed these proposed cutbacks, the Navy-
described their process as a "rephasing" of PCS moves to
achieve the desired savings. In actuality, the Navy was only
extending the Planned Rotation Dates for some service members
who were due to rotate in one fiscal year to the next.
However, Congress responded by saying that if PCS moves can be
"rephased" for FY 87, then they can also be "rephased" for FY
88, and cut the proposed FY 8 8 budget by the same amount. It
was at this point that Commander Keller recognized the need
for a model to come up with the "numbers" to justify budget
requests and to be able to prepare impact statements for the
proposed reductions during budget hearings. Commander
Keller's model was first used in the FY 89 budget process.
The model is discussed in the following section.
2. Model Structure
Commander Keller's model consists of a series of
formulas that produce move estimates for three types of moves:
enlisted training moves; enlisted rotational moves; and
enlisted operational moves. All the data required for the
model are obtained in- house (i.e., from BUPERS) and can be
stored on a personal computer (PC) . These input data consist
primarily of PRDs, school quotas, and retention forecasts.
Retention statistics are obtained from Pers-2 from the CNO
Retention Team. These are overall retention forecasts and are
not broken down by term of enlistment or type of duty. A
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Macintosh spreadsheet is used to tabulate the various
equations that comprise the model.
Commander Keller structured his model based on the
assumption that all operational, rotational, and training
moves do not have the same priority; that is, some moves must
happen. Training moves were considered a first priority as
they are necessary to ensure safety of operations and
readiness of the fleet. Commander Keller felt that if you are
going to maintain a school system in order to train people to
use sophisticated weapons systems, you must first be able to
move people to and from schools. Therefore, the training
moves equation is the starting calculation in the model.
Rotational moves were forecast next because members
assigned to overseas billets must move after completing the
maximum tour length prescribed by DOD, unless they voluntarily
extend their assignment. Although some operational moves also
"must" happen, (e.g., nuclear propulsion plant operators),
these represent a relatively small number of moves, and
therefore, operational moves were determined last and
represent a residual of the training and rotational move
forecasts. The logic here is that if you are not moving to or
from training, and the move does not involve transoceanic
shipment, then it is an operational move. The individual
formulas for each of the three move categories are discussed
in the sections that follow.
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a. Training Moves (TRA)
The Training moves estimate begins with input
received from the Assistant Chief for Total Force
Training/Education (Pers-11) . For a given fiscal year, Pers-
11 provides a list of training quotas to Pers-20 for all
school assignments which are 20 weeks or longer. This figure
is then doubled since moves "into" and "out of" school are
considered separate moves. The training moves formula is
thus
:
TRA = (Total quotas at schools greater than 20 weeks) x 2
b. Rotational Moves (ROT)
To order to forecast ROT moves, Commander Keller
analyzed them over the preceding three years (FY 86, 87, 88)
to find: 1) the rate at which members filled overseas billets
by making ROT moves; and 2) the rate at which members leaving
overseas made ROT moves. Commander Keller's analysis showed
that fifty-nine percent of members going to overseas billets
made ROT moves (the others made operational or accession
moves) . Rotational moves involve transoceanic shipment of
household goods. All personnel stationed overseas do not make
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moves that require transoceanic shipment of household goods.
For example, a member may rotate from shore duty in Hawaii to
sea duty in Hawaii and vice versa. Commander Keller's
analysis further showed that eighty- five percent of members
leaving from overseas tours made rotational moves. [Ref. 5:
p. 4]
To determine the total number of ROT moves from overseas,
the data in the Enlisted Master Record (EMR) was used to
obtain the number of fiscal year 1990 PRDs for those personnel
in overseas billets. Subtracted from this figure are the
number of fiscal year 1990 expected separations (19% of total
PRDs) , estimated fiscal year 1990 "other losses" (5% of total
PRDs) , and fiscal year 1990 estimated annual extensions
(5,500). Commander Keller had observed overseas extensions
for the prior three years and felt this number had always been
fairly consistent. These estimates were based upon Commander
Keller's past experience. This adjusted PRD figure was then
multiplied by the move rate from overseas (85% of overseas PRD
rollers) to obtain the gross estimate of moves from overseas.
Commander Keller subtracted one percent of the gross
number of moves from overseas as a policy correction factor to
account for erroneous overseas PRDs. Additionally, he added
to this figure the estimated number of "immediate avails"
expected to move during the forecast horizon. "Immediate
avails" are people that are moved without regard to PRD.
These moves would typically involve humanitarian
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reassignment s . The resulting number equals the net ROT moves
from overseas
.
Similarly, the number of ROT moves made to overseas
assignments was determined by taking overseas PRDs and
subtracting estimated overseas extensions from this figure.
This figure represented the number of "rollers" needed to fill
overseas billets. A "roller" is the unofficial term used by
BUPERS budget planners to define service members who are being
assigned from one permanent duty station to another. To
decide the gross number of ROT moves made to overseas
assignments, the number of "rollers" were multiplied by the
percentage of ROT moves made to overseas assignments (59% of
total PRDs) . From this sub- total, Commander Keller subtracted
one percent of the gross number of moves to overseas
assignments as a policy correction factor. The result is an
estimate of the net number of rotational moves made to
overseas assignments. The forecast for all ROT moves equals
the total net moves from and to overseas. The rotational move
formulas are presented below. [Ref. 5: p. 4]
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= Rollers From Overseas




= Gross Moves From Overseas 15,342
Policy correction (1%) 153
Avails 1.235
= Net ROT Moves From Overseas 16,424
NET ROT MOVES TO OVERSEAS (FY 9 0)
PRDs overseas
Less: Extentions
= Rollers To Overseas




Times : Rate To Overseas (.59)
= Gross Moves To Overseas 15,109
151
= Net Rot Moves To Overseas 31,382
TOTAL ROT=NET ROT MOVES FROM OVERSEAS + NET ROT MOVES TO OVERSEAS
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c. Operational Moves (OP)
To estimate OP moves, the model starts with the
total number of PRDs for the fiscal year. Next, the moves "to
training, " (1/2 of the total TRA moves) are subtracted from
this figure as well as the total number of ROT moves, overseas
separations and other overseas losses, and overseas
extensions. The difference is the number of OP move
"rollers." From this number, subtractions are made for a one
percent policy correction (1% of OP move "rollers") for
erroneous PRDs, the number of estimated separations for fiscal
year 1990 (19%) , other estimated losses for fiscal year 1990
(5%) , and the number of estimated extensions for fiscal year
1990. These estimates were based on historical data on file
at Pers-20. No- cost moves are also subtracted from this
total. An estimate of 25% of total moves (OP, ROT, and TRA)
is used. This 25% estimate was based on observations made
over several years. Finally, added to this figure are the
number of members who are expected to be immediately available
for a PCS move. The result is the total OP moves. The
calculations are presented below.
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ENLISTED OPERATIONAL MOVES (FY-90)
Total PRDs 150,341
Less: TO Training moves 13,870
ROT moves 31,382
Overseas Seps. 6,004
Other Overseas Losses 1,555
Overseas Extens. 5.500
= Operational Moves 92,030






No- cost moves 44,000
Plus: Avails 9.210
= Total Operational Moves 32 f 156
3. Model Assumptions and Adjustments
Commander Keller provided the following comments
regarding the model's assumptions and errors: [Ref . 5: p. 5]
a. When inputing estimates to the model, a
deliberate attempt was made at providing conservative
estimates. This was done to ensure that if errors in
forecasting PCS moves are made, that these errors are over-
forecast errors rather than under- forecast errors. The
motivation behind this was to be able to provide some degree
of "detailer flexibility" allowing him/her to make a move that
might not be totally aligned with PCS policy, but that makes
good PCS move sense. In retrospect, Commander Keller feels
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that the figure for combined total "losses" for Operational
Moves appears too high (estimated separations plus other
losses was 24% in FY 90) . Commander Keller thinks a more
accurate total loss rate would be closer to twenty- three
percent.
b. The method used to determine TRA moves was not
as accurate as it could have been for two reasons: 1) the
Navy fails to fill all school quotas, and 2) the TRA move
formula fails to account for co-located training (i.e., two or
more training courses, which by themselves are each less than
twenty weeks, but when combined total twenty weeks or
greater) . For example, co- located training would include
submarine training schools where a member graduates from a
basic course to a more advanced course given at the same
geographic location. Co- located training in excess of twenty
weeks constitutes a PCS training move. Commander Keller felt
that these two differences would offset each other, thus still
providing a reasonable approximation of the PCS move
requirement
.
c. In determining the ROT move rate for members
departing from assignments outside the continental United
States, the model should have considered only those members
returning to the continental United States. In failing to do
so, the model double counts rotational moves executed for
those members who will be serving consecutive overseas tours.
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d. Commander Keller deliberately underestimated
extensions overseas and in CONUS . For FY 92, he estimates
that extensions overseas are underestimated by approximately
1,000 and extensions in CONUS by 700. [Ref. 5: p. 5]
e. In determining the ROT moves from overseas, the
gross number of moves was determined and then the policy
correction factor was deducted. The policy correction factor
should have been deducted from the number of moves from
overseas prior to obtaining the gross moves figure.
f
.
A random sample of the Enlisted Master Records
(EMR) revealed that the rate of erroneous overseas PRDs was
approximately three percent and that the rate of erroneous
CONUS PRDs was approximately five percent. To increase model




The Pers-20 model, developed by Commander Keller, has
been evaluated for its accuracy in forecasting total enlisted
PCS cost moves. A comparison was made by the author between
actual moves and the forecast for the fiscal years from 1989
through 1991. The percentage deviation between the actual
values and the estimates was used as a measure of forecast
accuracy using the following formula:
[forecast -actual /actual]
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These values and the percentage forecast error are shown in
Table 9
.
TABLE 9. --TOTAL ENLISTED COST PCS MOVES FY 89-91 (PERS-20
MODEL FORECAST COMPARISON)
FY Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
89 92,167 93,931 -1.88
90 91,278 95,778 -4.70
91 91,822 99,253 -7.49
Source: NPRDC; CDR Keller
In evaluating the model in terms of forecast accuracy, one
can see that the margin of error is increasing in each of the
three fiscal years for which the model was run. Commander
Keller viewed this situation in two ways. First, he believes
that there was not an execution monitoring system in place to
ascertain how well assignments followed policy direction
during this period. Secondly, Commander Keller claimed that
if a correction was applied to the model based on the first
year's performance, then the rate of error would have remained
constant, at least for the first two years.
In comparing Table 3 (p. 36) and Table 9, the results show
that the Pers-20 model developed by Commander Keller
outperformed the NPRDC PCS ORT model for FY 19 89 through FY
1990. However, measuring forecast accuracy in terms of
execution can cause forecast accuracy problems. There are two
primary reasons for this. First, to some extent there is, in
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a given fiscal year, a causal relationship between the
forecast error and the number of moves actually executed. This
was explained in more detail in Chapter III. Second, in an
environment in which the objective is to spend all the PCS
funds allocated for a given fiscal year, it is hard to
determine the actual requirement. One suggestion to remedy
this situation might be to make only those moves in a given
fiscal year that were budgeted for.
Commander Keller and the author made some adjustments to
the Pers-20 model in an attempt to improve forecast accuracy.
It is first necessary, however, to provide some background
relevant to these adjustments.
a. Background on the Pers-20 Model Adjustments
In the first interview the author conducted with
Mr. Ed Timco, Head of Automated Information Systems Support
for Pers-7, Mr. Timco stated that any forecasting model based
on PRDs probably is not an accurate forecasting method. As
all the models reviewed during the research were based on
first determining PRDs, this was alarming. Mr. Timco went on
to explain that PRDs can and are changed by the detailers
quite frequently. In his opinion, detailers are an end-
motivated group of individuals whose primary concern is to get
the member moved. This is probably as it should be; however,
it does cause some problems with the validity of using PRDs as
a planning tool.
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Another problem was discovered during the research. Many
members are moved in advance of their PRDs . This could result
in an increase in PCS requirements since unprogrammed moves
(which were anticipated in the next fiscal year) from a
subsequent fiscal year could deplete current year funding.
The problem is one of data source reliability with respect to
PRDs. Additional research revealed that, as orders are
written, the PRD is erased from the Enlisted Master Record
(EMR) . This is critical because the author was interested in
obtaining a survey of an actual move distribution versus the
respective PRDs.
Commander Al Rouse, Head, Pers-2 03, conducted a study in
August 1991 in which he matched PRDs to their estimated date
of departures (EDDs) , which is set by the detailer. Commander
Rouse obtained his data from the MFS system. The purpose of
this study was to compare the planning assumptions (i.e.,
PRDs) with the actual distribution behavior (i.e., EDDs).
Results from this analysis revealed that, in FY 90, thirty-
eight percent of moves were early by an average of eleven
months. Of these early moves, fifty- four percent, or
approximately 25,000, were made using funding from outside the
fiscal year in which the move was programmed. This is
significant because, as mentioned earlier, moves made from the
ensuing fiscal years are neither programmed nor budgeted for
in the current year. Similarly, data from 1991 revealed that
thirty- five percent of PCS moves were an average of 11 months
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early and fifty- two percent of these were outside the fiscal
year in which the move was programmed. [Ref. 6: p. 2]
Commander Rouse noted in the analysis that the majority
of early detachments were either based on current sea/shore
rotation policy, or were accomplished for career progression
purposes. The magnitude of the numbers, however, would appear
to back up the statement made by Mr. Timco regarding the
suspect reliability of PRDs as the basis for PCS budget
forecasting. Commander Rouse's analysis further estimated
that the unprogrammed costs could be as high as $83 million
for the FY 1991 moves which were made from outside the fiscal
year in which the move was programmed. This calculation was
based on the number of early moves by type and the average
cost per move, also by type. [Ref. 6: p. 3]
Jb. Adjustments Made to the Pers-20 Model
An attempt was made by Commander Keller and the
author to apply a correction factor to the Pers-20 model based
on the results of the analysis conducted by Commander Rouse.
Two techniques were employed to accomplish these adjustments,
which the author shall label adjustments "inside" the model
and adjustments "outside" the model.
(1) Adjustments "Inside" the Model
Commander Keller felt that if the percentages
of early moves identified in Commander Rouse's analysis can be
applied equally to both cost and no- cost moves, then the
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formulas for the Operational and Rotational moves could be
adjusted within the model based on the corresponding early-
move percentages . The model could then be rerun and the
results compared with the original forecasts to determine if
forecast accuracy is improved. Training moves were not
adjusted since there are a finite number of quotas and,
consequently, it is difficult to over-abscribe this move
category. [Ref. 7: p. 2]
Rotational (ROT) moves required two adjustments, one for
moves "from overseas" and another for moves "to overseas".
First, for ROT moves "from overseas," the one percent policy
correction factor in the original model was zeroed out. Next,
the number of "immediate avails" was changed from a constant
(1,235) to a percentage of ROT moves made early based on
Commander Rouse's calculations. The number of ROT moves "to
overseas" was similarly calculated.
For Operational moves the methodology was the same (i.e.
basically zeroing out all policy correction factors and
previous immediate avails figures and then adding back the
percentage of Operational moves projected as being "early").
The number of Operational moves, which in effect are a
residual from the number of Rotational moves, was still
determined based on the originally scheduled PRDs for
Rotational moves. The revised Keller model was then run; the
results are presented in Table 10. Comparing Tables 9 and 10,
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the percent forecast error is greater in FY 90, but lower in
FY 91.
TABLE 10. --CORRECTION FACTOR APPLIED INSIDE THE MODEL
FY Forecast Actual Error (Percent)
90 106,398 95,778 11.08
91 102,602 99,253 3.30
(2) Adjustments "Outside" the Model
It is the author's opinion that the model
developed by Commander Keller is subject to some amount of
stochastic error simply by design (i.e., it is a simple model
and is not intended to precisely capture every determinant of
move behavior) . Additionally, there are numerous random
factors affecting execution each period. Further refinement
of the model, therefore, might not provide a more accurate
forecast. The author decided to apply a simple correction
factor to Commander Kellers model's results rather than adjust
the various equations which make up the model.
Additionally, the author disagreed with Commander Keller
on at least one important point: that training moves would
also have to be adjusted to account for early moves. Despite
Commander Keller's assumption that you cannot over-ascribe
training moves due to a finite number of quotas, training
moves do occur early. This might be due to schools having
more seats available than students, or an assignment policy
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that allows for PRDs to be adjusted to fulfill training
requirements. The latter is more likely since thirty- five
percent of all training moves in FY 91 were executed prior to
the schedule PRD.
The author's results, which are displayed in Table 11,
were determined by taking the original forecasts for FY 9 and
FY 91, and applying a correction factor of 20.1% and 18.2%
respectively, in order to account for the moves that occurred
from subsequent fiscal years. The 20.1% was derived following
the logic that 38% of FY 90 moves were early and of these, 53%
were outside the fiscal year. The subsequent result is that
20.1% were early and outside FY 90. The FY 91 correction
percentage was derived similarly. After applying this
correction factor, all other correction factors and Commander
Keller's previous adjustments for "immediate avails" were
eliminated. Comparing Table 11 to Tables 9 and 10, the
forecast error is the smallest in Table 11.
TABLE 11.- -CORRECTION FACTOR APPLIED OUTSIDE THE MODEL
FY Forecast Actual Error
(Percent)
90 98,876 95,778 3.23
91 97,666 99,253 -1.60
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(3) Comments on the Pers-20 Model
The Pers-20 model, developed by Commander
Keller, provides a logical conceptual foundation from which
further refinements are necessary to enhance the model's
usefulness as a forecasting tool. Commander Keller's model
shows some improvement over prior forecasting procedures,
which relied on extrapolation from historical data. This
model is the first attempt to link move behavior to
independent variables and to identify the causative
determinants of PCS move requirements
.
The author feels the Pers-20 model is superior to the
NPRDC PCS ORT model for three reasons: 1) the model did
better than the NPRDC model in terms of forecast accuracy in
fiscal years 1989 and 1991; 2) there is no additional cost
for collecting the data or for maintaining the model; 3) the
model equations can be easily altered when either new factors
which affect PCS moves are identified or when move policies
are changed. [Ref. 1: p. 6]
There is, however, a need for an improved model. With
today's tight fiscal budgets, the Navy can ill -afford the
luxury of miscalculating PCS move budget requirements by the
range of forecasting errors that have been observed in both of
the models reviewed. However, some of the factors that
contribute to these errors were identified. This could lead
to improved forecasting accuracy if considered in concert with
a review of existing PCS policies.
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One suggestion for the Keller model is that extensions,
both overseas and in CONUS, be made constants in the model.
This could be documented in the model as an independent
variable with separate retention statistics applied for first
and second term enlistees as well as for careerists.
The final question remains. Does the Pers-20 model
developed by Commander Keller improve the status quo? Based
on the above analysis, the author feels that it unquestionably
did.
B. QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF THE PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION
(PCS) BUDGET ON NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL UNIT READINESS
Readiness of the Fleet has always been a paramount concern
of Navy commanders whether serving ashore or at sea. It
follows then that a principle concern of budget officers when
faced with a PCS account reduction is to try to assess the
impact of this reduction on readiness. This is not easy to
do. The criteria that comprise readiness are rather nebulous
and hard to quantify. Nevertheless, there are those who
recognize the importance of being able to defend the PCS
budget in terms of readiness impacts. One of those who
recognized this importance is Captain Dick Hayes. His efforts
to develop a model which could show the effects of budgets




While serving as head of BUPERS Distribution
Management and Control (Pers-46) , Captain Hayes saw the need
for a model that could answer the following question: "If we
cut the PCS budget by $20 million, what are the effects on
readiness?" It was his belief that cuts which occur to the
PCS budget during the budget review process were detrimental
to fleet readiness. Captain Hayes was willing to sponsor a
model that would give you the "what -if" effects of a budget
cut. The model, which was developed by NPRDC in 1991 under
his sponsorship, is titled "Quantifying the Impact of the
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Budget on Navy Enlisted
Personnel Unit Readiness." [Ref. 8: p. 1] The approach taken
by the NPRDC model developers is described below.
2 . Approach
In searching for a way to measure the impact of a PCS
budget cut, the NPRDC model developers turned to the existing
framework by which the services estimate unit readiness. All
operational service units are required to submit Status of
Readiness and Training reports (SORTS) on an as required basis
to keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advised of each unit's
state of readiness. Part of the SORTS report contains
information on personnel readiness. The NPRDC model was
developed using this personnel readiness rating. However,
some refinement of this personnel readiness measure was
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necessary. This was due to the fact that, as they currently
exist, personnel readiness measures cannot distinguish among
small differences in manning levels.
The Navy measures fleet personnel readiness using a scale
known as the C- rating. For example, a C-l rating signifies
that a unit is fully combat ready. A C-2 rating means
substantially combat ready, and a C-3 rating means marginally
combat ready, while a C-4 rating means not combat ready.
Within these broad categories, a ship's manning
(personnel/billets) can vary by nearly ten percent without
altering the ship's C-rating. A more accurate readiness
measure was needed to account for the effects of PCS moves.
[Ref. 8: p. 1]
In addition, measuring fleet personnel readiness includes
complex resource allocation decisions. Fleet personnel
readiness measures involve the use of a unit's manning level
and mission area (e.g., mobility, antisubmarine warfare,
etc.) . A unit is given a C-rating based on its lowest mission
area rating. There are up to nineteen mission areas possible
and each mission area contains personnel in multiple
occupations and skill levels. Therefore, a given occupation
or skill level can contribute to the readiness of multiple
mission areas. Determining the best way to allocate resources
under these conditions remains a difficult problem. [Ref. 8:
p. 1]
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Mission area personnel readiness ratings (M- ratings) range
in value from M-l to M-4. An M-l rating for a mission area
such as anti-air warfare (AAW) would signify that there are
enough personnel with the proper qualifications to effectively
perform the AAW mission. An M-4 rating denotes severe
deficiencies, and the inability to perform in that mission
area.
The M- ratings are based on manning within pay grades E-l
through E-9. Table 12 shows the manning levels that are used
to determine the M- rating for a mission area. The table
shows, for example, that the M- rating for a unit is M-l if the
manning for pay grades E-l to E-9 (collectively) is at least
ninety percent and the manning for pay grades E-5 to E-9 is at
least eighty- five percent. The specified manning levels for
both the E-l to E-9 group and the E-5 to E-9 group need to be
satisfied. If E-l to E-9 manning is ninety percent, while the
E-5 to E-9 manning falls to eighty percent, for instance, then
the mission area is classified as M-2. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
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M-l 85% and above 90% and above
M-2 75%-84% 80%-89%
M-3 65%-74% 70%-79%
M-4 less than 65% less than 70%
Source: NPRDC
As seen in Table 12, the rating scales are unresponsive to
relatively small changes in manning levels. For example, a
unit with seventy- eight percent manning in pay grades E-5
through E-9 and eighty percent manning in pay grades E-l
through E-9 would be classified as M-2. If E-5 through E-9
manning were increased six percent and E-l through E-9 were
increased nine percent, the unit would still be classified as
M-2. To overcome this problem, NPRDC devised the continuous
readiness measure presented below. [Ref. 8: p. 3]
Let x be the pay grade E-5 to E-9 manning percentage and
y be the E-l to E-9 manning percentage, then the continuous
readiness measure level r is given by:
r = 10 - min f (x + 5) . yl
10
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The current readiness measure (M) can be defined in terms
of r as follows:
1 if r < 1
M= 2 if 1 < r < 2
3 if 2 < r < 3
4 if r > 3
Again, a unit's readiness value is equal to the lowest level
among its mission areas. [Ref. 8: p. 3]
A comparison of the current Readiness Measures (M- ratings)
and the NPRDC continuous measures is presented in Table 13.
The results show a significant improvement in the ability to













85 90 1.0 1
84 89 1.1 2
83 88 1.2 2
82 87 1.3 2
81 86 1.4 2
80 85 1.5 2
79 84 1.6 2
78 83 1.7 2
75 80 2.0 2
74 79 2.1 3
73 78 2.2 3
72 77 2.3 3
71 76 2.4 3
70 75 2.5 3
69 74 2.6 3
68 73 2.7 3
67 72 2.8 3
66 71 2.9 3
65 70 3.0 4
64 69 3.1 4
63 68 3.2 4
62 67 3.3 4
61 66 3.4 4
60 65 3.5 4
57 62 3.8 4
56 61 3.9 4
55 60 4.0 4
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3 . Relating Readiness to PCS Moves
NPRDC uses two data files maintained by the Enlisted
Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) as a source of input to a
PC- based program called READY. This computer program was
designed to relate PCS moves to personnel unit readiness. The
two data files, labeled Ul and U2 , contain information on
organizational personnel shortages and personnel requirements,
and the corresponding mission areas. Based on this input, the
READY model then allocates moves by Unit Identification Code
(UIC) . [Ref . 8: p. 5]
The READY program is able to provide two capabilities that
did not exist before in a single model. These new
capabilities are: 1) the ability of the model to calculate the
manpower demands for separate mission areas based on a
continuous readiness measure; and 2) the ability of the model
to calculate moves for all readiness measures simultaneously.
The model also computes the number of moves required to
achieve a range of readiness levels. READY focuses on moves
for any desired time horizon within the next twelve months.
READY accumulates the moves, which improve readiness from r to
r - 6, where 6 = .05 and r = 10, 10 - 6, 10 - 26, ..., 1. In
addition, information by unit and mission area is kept in an
internal table for producing a cumulative readiness curve. A
detailed description of the READY program, to include how
READY accumulates the moves to improve readiness, is provided
in Appendix A. [Ref. 8: p. 6]
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4. READY Model Results
In a hypothetical example, the READY model was used to
estimate the impact on readiness resulting from a reduction in
the PCS budget. Table 14 is an example of a PCS move plan for
a five -month period. For each type of move, Table 14 shows
average cost per move, currently planned moves and their cost,
as well as reduced budget moves and their cost. [Ref . 8: p. 7]













OP $2400 10,500 $25.2 7,875 $18.9
ROT $4400 1,800 $7.9 1,620 $7.1
TRA $1200 5,000 $6.0 5,000 $6.0
Total 17,300 $39.1 14,495 $32.0
In this example, the current budget is $39.1 million,
while the reduced budget is $32.0 million. The current move
plan is for 10,500 operational, 1,800 rotational, and 5,000
training moves. The reduced budget plan calls for 7,875
operational, 1,600 rotational, and 5,000 training moves.
[Ref. 8: p. 7]
In calculating the effect that a reduction in moves has
on readiness, NPRDC estimated the percentages of each type of
move that affect readiness. These estimates used historical
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billet and personnel data obtained from EPMAC. The results
showed that thirty- eight percent of operational, twenty- five
percent of rotational, and zero percent of training moves
affect readiness. The reason that training moves were
estimated to have no affect on the readiness measure is that
most shore based units are not included in readiness
reporting, hence no readiness calculation exists for them.
The model sponsors recognized this as a shortcoming of the
READY model
.
To get the number of moves affecting readiness under the
current and reduced budget move plans, the estimated
percentages of operational, rotation, and training moves which
affect readiness are multiplied by the number of moves in
Table 14. Table 15 provides the calculated number of moves
affecting readiness under the current and reduced budget move
plans. The results show that the reduction in moves
translates to a drop in readiness from 1.85 to 2.30 under the
reduced budget. [Ref. 8: p. 8]
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TABLE 15. --UNIT READINESS MOVES AND READINESS RATING











5 . Comments on the Performance of the READY Model
The model described above was able to estimate the
impact on mission and personnel unit readiness given a
reduction in the number of PCS moves. It was also able to
estimate the total number of moves required to bring all units
in the simulation up to a readiness level of 1.0. As noted
earlier, the model cannot gauge the impact on readiness for
shore commands because most shore commands are not included in
the readiness calculations to begin with. The NPRDC model
developers believe that this shortcoming could be easily
overcome by expanding the definition of readiness to cover all
units. This expanded definition would be analogous to the M-
rating criteria already used by operational commands.
These attributes led the author to conclude that this
model has significant potential as a tool in supporting PCS
budget proposals. Captain Caroline George, Head, Allocation
Division (Pers-45) , stated that the model seems best suited
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for considering readiness just for manning purposes. However,
Captain George also maintained that the model could be used in
justifying the PCS budget. Attempts to obtain additional
critiques of the model were hampered due to the fact that most
of those contacted were not aware of the model's existence or
the current status of the model
.
6. Status of the READY Model
Further development of the READY model by NPRDC has
been terminated pending future funding for expansion of the
model. The official report on the model was released to
BUPERS in June 1991. AT the time of the report's release, the
model's sponsor had rotated, and other key leaders who had
championed the project had either rotated or retired. The
Head, Distribution Support (Pers-47) , had been the original
sponsor of the project. However, Pers-45 has since been
designated as the decision point for research and development
projects for Pers-4. The model was not on the Pers-4 research
and development projects list for fiscal year 1992.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter provides conclusions and recommendations
based on the research presented in the previous four chapters.
Both conclusions and recommendations will be presented in two
parts: 1) those pertaining to the PCS forecasting models,
and 2) those dealing with the PCS planning process.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. PCS Forecasting Models
The Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) currently lacks
a PCS move forecasting model that provides accurate and
reliable forecasts to support annual budget requests. In
addition, the existing forecasting models are unrelated to
actual execution behavior. Finally, none of the forecasting
models can estimate the impact of various policy changes on
PCS move requirements. Consequently, there is a need for a
PC-based interactive forecasting model that can provide an on-
line query capacity to address the "what if" types of
questions pertaining to changes in PCS policies or other
influencing external factors.
The NPRDC PCS ORT Moves Forecasting Model is insufficient
to meet the needs of budget planners. Because it is a time-
series forecasting model, it is insensitive to policy changes
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until a year or more after the change has been implemented.
The review of forecast accuracy presented in Chapter III
revealed that an unacceptably high margin of error existed in
fiscal years 1989 and 1991. The errors for these years are -
8.09% and -8.43% respectively. In addition, the model is
unrelated to actual move execution behavior. During the
execution phase of PCS management, there needs to be some
method of linking the most recent move execution to move
requirements for the remainder of the fiscal year. Pers-463,
the execution manager, sees this as the most deficient aspect
of the model
.
The Pers-20 model, developed by Commander Keller, was the
first attempt to link move behavior to independent variables,
and to identify the causative determinants of PCS move
requirements. Operated on a Macintosh spreadsheet, the model
outperformed the official NPRDC model in terms of forecast
accuracy, and had the added benefit of being able to easily
alter the equations that make up the model when policy
variables are changed. More importantly, the model was
developed at little cost to the Navy. The Keller model,
however, is also subject to some of the shortcomings discussed
in relation to the NPRDC PCS ORT model. The margin of error
for the model is increasing in each of the three years for
which data is available and the model is also unrelated to
execution behavior.
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The READY program, developed by NPRDC as a means of
quantifying the impact of "PCS" budget reductions on personnel
unit readiness, was analyzed and the results are encouraging.
This model may turn out to be very useful as a method of
assisting in the formulation of impact statements during
budget review. The author feels that the recent initiatives
to develop a new PCS forecasting model should also include the
READY program as a sort of "backend" calculation. This
program was designed to run on a personal computer. After
obtaining forecasts from the PCS model, the output could be
entered into the READY program. This would allow alternative
move programs to be analyzed with respect to readiness
impacts. This will be addressed in further detail in the
recommendations section.
The need exists, therefore, for a new PCS forecasting
model. There does not exist the latitude in the PCS program
today for the range of errors observed in both the PCS
forecasting models reviewed. At the time of this writing,
Commander Rouse, Head, Pers-2 03, was chairing a Quality
Management Board (QMB) that is designing a new PCS forecasting
model based on enlisted end strength.
2 . The PCS Planning and Budgeting Process
The management and budgeting of PCS funds is hostage
to several process constraints. The author explored these
process constraints for two reasons: 1) the Navy has embraced
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Total Quality Leadership (TQL) and process improvement
constitutes the very bedrock of TQL, and 2) financial managers
expressed frustration with some of the artificial barriers
that existed between the organizations involved with PCS
management and budgeting. These barriers interfered with the
flow of information and communication. Each of the process
constraints will be addressed separately below.
The current two-step costing process introduced in
Chapter II is problematic given poor data source reliability.
In addition, in the author's opinion, the process is
burdensome and inefficient. First of all, PCSVAD, Cleveland,
has historically only received approximately fifty percent of
the Travel Information Forms (TIF) upon which the step II cost
is based. This means that the remaining, uncosted PCS moves
must be obligated based on the original step I reservation
cost. It is both time consuming and costly to go through this
process of matching reservations with obligations when they
only receive half of the input data to begin with.
Secondly, the Permanent Change of Station Variance
Analysis Department (PCSVAD) has existed since the mid-
seventies. As its name would imply, it is tasked with
analyzing variances between step I reservations and step II
obligations. It is the author's opinion that they should be
able to gauge the approximate difference between the
reservation and obligation amounts. This would support the
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elimination of the step II cost estimation, as they should be
able to approximate the impact of step I costing.
Thirdly, the author investigated whether the information
contained on the TIF could be automated with the information
being entered on the Detaching Endorsement Form 3067, which is
automatically sent out coincident with a member's detachment
from the command. Presumably, this would bring the compliance
rate up to 100%. Pers-7 budget planners rejected this idea,
stating that there was too much information to transfer onto
a Form 3067. Further investigation revealed Pers-103, the
Requirements Section of the Source Data System Division, had
already drawn up specifications for such a form in May of
1990. However, there are no development plans for this form
at the present time due to manpower and funding constraints.
Fourth, PCSVAD employs approximately 30 civilian personnel
for PCS processing activities, of which approximately 15 are
data entry clerks charged with entering the data from the TIF
into the PRODS system. The author feels that whether you
automate the TIF form or do away with the second step in the
costing process, you will realize substantial cost savings
that could be used to move sailors.
Finally, the author sensed from the interviews conducted
with the Pers-4 and Pers-7 budget officers, that a major
impediment to implementing a one- step costing process was the
inability of Pers-7, who as the central manager for the MPN
appropriation is responsible for expending the PCS account, to
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work in concert with Pers-4, who manages personnel
distribution. If the PCS budget account is overspent, Pers-7
is responsible, and therefore, may be unwilling to relinquish
to Pers-4 this extra control over the detailing process. If
each organization were assigned a supporting role to assist
the other in performance of the other's primary functions with
respect to PCS management, then this could be avoided. Again,
this is also in line with the TQL previously mentioned.
Specifically, Point Nine of Deming's 14 points, calls for the
breaking down of barriers between departments, and working as
a team to foresee problems in production and procedures in use
that may be encountered with the product or service. [Ref . 9:
p. 1]
The data redundancy identified in Chapter II between the
MFS and PRODS systems is a major source of inefficiency in the
management of PCS funds. By maintaining obligation and
reservation data on both BUPER's MFS and PCSVAD's PRODS, data
is duplicated. As with any unnecessary redundancy, the
possibility of inconsistency between the two data bases is
high. When data, expected to be consistent, varies, time and
energy must be devoted to unnecessary reconciliation.
Valuable time reserved for constructive duties is often spent
determining which data base is accurate. [Ref. 3: p. 22]
Recent interviews with Pers-7 and PCSVAD indicate that the
PRODS and MFS databases will be merged some time within the
next 12 to 15 months. In a phone conversation with Mr. John
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Lorenz, Head, PCSVAD, of 5 November, 1991, he considered this
time line for the merger of the two data bases optimistic.
Mr. Lorenz also stated that he has drafted working papers
outlining the functional requirements for this merger. A
primary time consideration for this merger is that PCSVAD is
considering using D-BASE II rather than the presently used
sequential files. The merger presents an opportunity to
consider implementing a one- step automated costing process
coincident with the establishment of a single shareable data
base for PCS data.
The Enlisted Automated Order Writing System (EAIS) does
not perform up to the expectations of both the users
(detailers) and financial managers. Several shortcomings with
the EAIS were discussed in Chapter II, chief among these were
the problems with the Customer Identification Code (CIC)
construction and the requirement to input the step I costs
manually. As a consequence of these system deficiencies,
approximately fifty percent of the enlisted orders are written
in the manual order writing system, RIS
.
EAIS, as designed, also cannot provide updated detailer
checkbook balances, which is desirable from a management
standpoint. There also exists no direct link between
EAIS/OAIS and PCSVAD. A direct link will eliminate the
current flow of orders information from EAIS to NES, to MFS,
and finally to PCSVAD. This direct link depends upon the
maintenance of accurate cost data within EAIS. A suggested
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target information flow is presented in the recommendations
section of this Chapter.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. PCS Forecasting Models
The following are recommendations for PCS forecasting
models
:
• Reevaluate the continuance of the NPRDC PCS ORT Moves
forecasting model. The PCS Quality Management Board
should examine this issue. This model has not been able
to garner much support from the intended users in BUPERS
during its three-year existence. As a time-series
forecasting model, it is insensitive to policy variation.
In addition, it is unrelated to actual execution behavior.
Finally, the model requires an annual contract fee. With
the Navy facing narrowing fiscal constraints, these funds
might be better used elsewhere.
• Develop a new PC-based PCS forecasting model. This model
needs to be capable of determining PCS move requirements
for budget formulation as well as relating to monthly or
weekly execution management. This model should be
interactive between input sources (i.e., Pers-11 training
statistics, retention statistics, and the Enlisted Master
Files) and decision makers (i.e., Pers-4, Pers-7, & Pers-
2). Finally, this model should be capable of estimating
the impact of various policy changes or external factors
which affect PCS move requirements (i.e., changes in
sea/shore rotation policies, tour extensions (voluntary as
well as those that result from policy changes) , force
structure changes and end strength reductions, retention
effects, and readiness impacts of PCS account reductions)
.
• Incorporate the readiness factor into the new PCS
forecasting model. Although still in the prototype stage,
the READY program, developed by NPRDC, demonstrated the
capability to estimate the impact on readiness resulting
from a decrease in PCS funding. The program was designed
to operate on a personal computer. A readiness moves
curve is created, which has PCS cost moves on the y-axis
and the continuous personnel readiness measure on the x-
axis. Along this curve, alternative move programs can be
analyzed with respect to readiness impacts. It is the
author's opinion that the READY program or a similar
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program could be used as a "backend" calculation in any-
new PCS forecasting model. This would enable financial
managers to create impact statements during PCS budget
review hearings.
• Study the effects of the size of the Individuals Account
(IA) on PCS moves. The Individuals Account is a personnel
overhead account. It consists of all those personnel who
are either in training, or on medical or legal hold, and
transient personnel who are in-between permanent duty
stations. While this account varies, it averages
approximately 11.5% of total enlisted end strength. The
author believes that a study of the relationship between
the IA size and PCS move requirements could be conducted
using a regression analysis approach. During such a
study, it would be useful to break down the population by
its length of service (LOS) distribution. This might
provide some insight into the indicators of move behavior
among those in the IA, who together represent a
significant portion of the total enlisted population.
2 . The PCS Planning and Budgeting Process
The following are recommendations for the PCS planning
and budgeting process:
• Conduct a high-level review of PCS policies. Interviews
with detailers during this research revealed that certain
PCS policies are restricting detailer flexibility. For
example, policies implemented to improve retention are
still in place which cause early detachments even though
retention is at an all-time high. [Ref. 10] Another
comment received was that, while many of these policies
made sense individually, when considered in the aggregate,
they can become unmanageable. One Commander likened it to
entitlement spending in the Federal budget. The author
investigated if there was any way of capturing the effects
of certain policies on PCS move requirements. The result
is that this would be extremely difficult for two reasons:
1) a lot of the policies do not remain in effect long
enough to discover if any trend exists, and 2) new
policies are constantly being implemented. The PCS QMB
has conducted a comprehensive detailer survey of policy
impacts on distribution behavior. As of this writing,
results are not available, but are expected soon. In
addition, Commander Rouse plans, as a follow- on effort, to
conduct a top-down review and cross-reference of existing
policies. [Ref. 10]
84
Eliminate two-step costing. The current two-step costing
process is considered inefficient given poor data source
reliability (TIF card submission compliance is
approximately fifty percent) . In addition, an improved
automated one- step process would eliminate the burdensome
process of matching reservation and obligation amounts, as
well as providing an updated detailer checkbook balance as
each set of orders is written. A one-step costing process
with a direct link to PCSVAD is illustrated in Figure 6.
Comparing this information flow in Figure 6 with that in
Figure 4, one can see that this provides a more logical
flow of information. Also, the author feels that with the
emphasis placed on Quality Management by the Navy today,
that the costing process should be done once, and done
correctly. The Permanent Change of Station Variance
Analysis Department (PCS VAD) has been in existance since
the mid- seventies . It is the author's opinion that enough
data exists to estimate the impact of one- step costing.
In discussing this with Commander Rouse, the Chairman of
the PCS QMB, he echoed this sentiment saying that they
have more than enough of a sample size with which to
conduct a statistical analysis. Implementation of this
recommendation would allow PCSVAD to concentrate their
energies on improving the one -step costing process rather
than spending their time reconciling obligation and
reservation amounts. Finally, implementation of this
recommendation would eliminate the need for 15 civilian
data entry clerks in PCS VAD. This is discussed in more
detail in the next recommendation.
Automate the Travel Information Form (TIF) . While the
author feels that the recommendation previously presented
would eventually eliminate the need for the current TIF
processing activities, he recognizes that there is
reluctance on behalf of Pers-7 to undertake this solution.
An alternative solution would be to automate the TIF.
Automation of this form and introducing it as a
requirement for local Personnel Support Detachments (PSDs)
to submit in concert with a member's detaching endorsement
(Form 3067) , would increase compliance presumably to 100%.
As mentioned previously, specifications for such a form
have been drawn up in Pers-103 (Source Data Systems).
However, no plans for development exist at this time. The
primary factor to consider here is the cost savings that
such action could achieve by automating this form. This
action would eliminate the need for the 15 civilian data
entry clerks at PCSVAD, Cleveland, charged with manually
entering the TIF data into the PRODS system. These
savings could be re -channeled into moving Navy personnel.
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• Reduce Data Redundancy. The MFS and PRODS database
systems basically perform the same function (i.e.,
matching PCS reservations and obligations) . Valuable time
is lost determining which report data is accurate,
however, as format differences and timing factors create
inconsistencies. Pers-7 does plan to merge these data
bases in the future. Another major source of data
redundancy exists because the automated enlisted order
writer (EAIS) is still not fully operational. As a
consequence, approximately fifty percent of enlisted
orders are written in the manual order writing system
(RIS) . Contracting assistance should be obtained to bring
this system up to full operational capability.
• Automate Step One Cost Tables. The detailer is
constrained by having to manually enter the estimated PCS
costs from the large, rather laborious step one tables.
A separate automated cost module should be designed and
implemented into EAIS. Past efforts to accomplish this
task were part of another larger project. The project was
terminated, and the step one automation effort, only a
sub- routine of this failed project, was terminated as























Two data files, Ul and U2 , maintained by the Enlisted
Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) contain the manning and
other information needed for readiness calculations.
1. Ul File
The Ul file contains personnel shortages in
requirements and requirements (MOB+1) by activity, occupation,
paygrade group, and time. Shortages are requirements minus
on-board personnel. Activities are coded by unit
identification code (UIC) . Occupations are coded by rate
code/Navy Enlisted Calssif ication (RCN) . This is the members'
rating or when appropriate their Navy Enlisted Classification
(NEC) . NEC is Navy enlisted classification and stands for a
specialized skill. MOB+1 is requirements within 1 month of an
actual mobilization. The Ul file contains indicators to show
which mission areas are affected by a given RCN. The file has
a record for each UIC and RCN combination. Only UICs that are
included in readiness calculations are in this file. We will
refer to this set of UICs as readiness UICs. There are 906
UICs and 15,097 records in the Ul file used for this work.
These counts will vary somewhat over time.
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The "shortages in requirements" in the Ul file are
actually shortages in a predefined percentage of requirements.
Let s equal shortages in requirements, q equal requirements
and b equal on-board personnel. The Ul file doesn't contain
b, so it must be calculated as follows:
s=0.85q-b if paygrade group E-5 through E-9
s=0.90q-b if paygrade group E-l through E-9
The manning percentage (m) for paygrade group E-5 through
E-9 can be calculated by:
m = b x 100 = 0.85q - s x 100
q q
The manning percentage for paygrade group E-l through E-9
is similarly calculated. The values 0.85 and 0.90 above
correspond to the M-l readiness rating. The Ul file also
contains values of s corresponding to M-2 and M-3 readiness
ratings. These values of s are contained in the Ul file
instead of the values of b to speed up interactive programs
that use the Ul file.
2. U2 File
The U2 file contains personnel shortages in
requirements and requirements by UIC and mission area. The
shortages in requirements contained in this file are defined
in the same way as in the Ul file above. The file has a
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record for each UIC and mission area. There are 19 mission
areas. Only readiness UICs are included. The U2 file
contained 4,616 records in June of 1991. This count will also
vary over time.
B. THE READY PROGRAM
READY, a FORTRAN program, was developed to calculate the
demands of manpower for mission areas based on the continuous
readiness measure. The program calculates moves for all
readiness activities in a single run and READY calculates
total moves by readiness level over a broad range of readiness
levels, for all readiness UICs.
Program READY has input file Ul and U2 . Also input to
READY is the time parameter, t, (t = 0, ..., 12).
READY can be summarized in the following steps (see also
the flow chart in Figure 7)
:
1. Determine all UICs with readiness level less than C-l by
finding the worst readiness level among the mission areas for
that UIC. Put these UICs in a table for sequential
processing.
2. If the table is empty, go to step 5; otherwise, for the
current UIC find the mission area with the worst readiness
level
.
3. Check if the UIC satisfies the readiness requirement.
If true, the current UIC is finished. Go back to step 2 and
process the next UIC on the list. If false, continue.
4. Find the worst manned RCN that affects the mission area.
Add one person to this RCN by paygrade group. The paygrade
group that has more impact on readiness is used. If there is
a tie, the upper group gets the person. Update the changes
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caused by this additional person. Write out the RCN, mission
area, and paygrade group for this move. Go back to step 2.
5. All UICs satisfy the readiness requirement; hence,
create the cumulative readiness curve. Stop.
READY writes to an output file the table of UICs from step
1, together with its original readiness, the worst mission
area and its manpower deficiencies for the two paygrade
groups. The table is then sorted by UIC and mission area
readiness. READY then accumulates the moves which improve the
readiness from r to r-<5 where 6 is the step size of the curve
(currently 6 = 0.05) and r = 10, 10-6, 10-26, ..., 1.
Information from each move is accumulated and kept in an
internal table for producing the cumulative readiness curve.
Then, READY will write this information to the output file.
Finally, when all moves are decided, READY writes the
cumulative readiness data to a second output file.
A flow chart of program READY is presented in Figure 7.
The program takes 2-3 minutes of CPU time and 2 megabytes of
core storage to run on the IBM 4341 at the Navy Personnel




Find all UlCs that have
readiness level lees than 0-1.
Put these UlCs in a table.





For the current UIO,
find the mission area
with the worst readiness level.
Has the UIC reached readiness level C-1 yet?
\ NO
Find the worst manned RCN that
affects the given mission area. ADD one
person and update the readiness levels.
(stop)
Figure 7- -Flow Chart of the Ready Program
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